AVRAMOVICH MARÍA CECILIA
Artículos
Título:
The Welfare Implications of the Meeting Design of a Cartel
Autor/es:
MARÍA CECILIA AVRAMOVICH
Revista:
REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
Editorial:
Springer US
Referencias:
Año: 2019
ISSN:
0889-938X
Resumen:
his paper investigates the welfare implications of introducing a delegation problem into a price-fixing collusion game. Within a model in which each cartel conspirator has an irreplaceable market expertise, I demonstrate that the delegation of decisions to representatives for concealment purposes can lead to inefficient decisions. In this context, while a more severe antitrust policy contributes to deterrence, it can also induce surviving cartels to maximize concealment through delegation, which creates inefficiencies that are not considered in standard models of collusion. Leniency programscan exacerbate this perverse effect of policy.
