Different theories try to explain children's abilities to attribute mental states (such as desires and beliefs) to other people. Perner´s Representational Theory of Mind (1991, 1995) sustains that desires and belief attributions depend on a theory about what are representations and how do they function. Such theory of mind permits the recognition of the "reference" and "truth" dimensions of propositions. In the present work I critically analyze the “Representational Theory of Mind” Theory. I argue that the notion of "metarepresentation" proposed by Perner is not an adequate one to understand the concept of "intentionality" as is proposed by Brentano in his characterization of mental states (Brentano,1898). I also criticize the conception that considers that the false belief test is a test of minimum complexity. I present an alternative explanation for the three year old children's difficulties to attribute false beliefs in laboratory tasks. Finally, I suggest that a better approach to the problem of mental attribution should focus in the processes that permits the recognition and comprehension of "attitudes" in other subjects.
Key Words: Theory of Mind - False belief test - Intentionality - Representations - Attitudes - Developmental Psychology.
