AVRAMOVICH MARÍA CECILIA
Congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Inside the Revolving Door: Campaign Finance, Lobbying Meetings and Public Contracts. An Investigation for Argentina
Lugar:
La Plata
Reunión:
Congreso; LIII Asociación Argentina de Economía Política; 2018
Institución organizadora:
Universidad de La Plata
Resumen:
This paper explores the relationship between political influence activities by interest groups and benefits obtained in the form of public contracts. We propose an electoral competition model where interest groups make ex-ante campaign contributions to candidates and ex-post lobbying contributions (efforts). Campaign contributions are useful to bias the election result although an aggresive campaign fight encourages interest groups to concentrate in lobbying activities.
Using a novel and unique dataset at the individual level, we find that lobbying meetings are positively correlated with public contract amount and the probability of obtaining a contract. This results holds when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Campaign contributions are not significantly related to either public contract amount or the probability of winning contracts.
Using a novel and unique dataset at the individual level, we find that lobbying meetings are positively correlated with public contract amount and the probability of obtaining a contract. This results holds when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Campaign contributions are not significantly related to either public contract amount or the probability of winning contracts.
