Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: An application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011

Revista de Economia y Estadistica

Cuarta Epoca

Lugar: Cordoba; Año: 2014 vol. 52 p. 113 - 113

div style="left: 174.452px; top: 717.145px; font-size: 12.4387px; font-family: serif; transform: scaleX(1.03194);" data-canvas-width="317.01087009803916"> We examine the impact of descentralized public policy in the form of inter-governmental fiscal transfers on local election outcomes ?the probability of reelection. We assemble a new and unique dataset recording every local executive election in the period 1995-2011 and examine the electoral effect of various types of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. We find that the odds of reelecting local incumbents are increasing in the incumbency dummies for both major parties. Local governments which receive a positive discretionary transfer from the provincial government have also associated higher odds of being reelected. The probability of reelection is also increasing in the difference in the vote share between the winner and the runner up in the previous election. Finally we find evidence that the amount of discretionary transf