FREILLE SEBASTIAN
Congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Inside the Revolving Door: Campaign Finance, Lobbying Meetings and Public Contracts. An Investigation for Argentina
Autor/es:
FREILLE, SEBASTIÁN; MONCARZ, PEDRO; AVRAMOVICH, MARIA CECILIA; SOFFIETTI, PABLO
Lugar:
La Plata
Reunión:
Congreso; LIII Reunión Anual de la Asociación Argentina de Economía Política; 2018
Institución organizadora:
Asociación Argentina de Economía Política
Resumen:
This paper explores the relationship between political in influence activities byinterest groups and benefits obtained in the form of public contracts. We proposean electoral competition model where interest groups make ex-ante campaigncontributions to candidates and ex-post lobbying contributions (eorts). Campaigncontributions are useful to bias the election result although an aggresivecampaign fight encourages interest groups to concentrate in lobbying activities.Using a novel and unique dataset at the individual level, we find that lobbyingmeetings are positively correlated with public contract amount and the probabilityof obtaining a contract. This results holds when controlling for unobservedheterogeneity. Campaign contributions are not signicantly related to eitherpublic contract amount or the probability of winning contracts.
