FREILLE SEBASTIAN
Congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Inside the Revolving Door: Campaign Finance, Lobbying Meetings and Public Contracts. An Investigation for Argentina
Autor/es:
AVRAMOVICH, CECILIA; FREILLE, SEBASTIÁN; MONCARZ, PEDRO; SOFFIETTI, PABLO
Lugar:
Buenos Aires
Reunión:
Taller; Taller Red 2019 - Corrupción y Políticas para su Prevención; 2018
Institución organizadora:
CAF-banco de Desarrollo de América Latina
Resumen:
This paper explores the relationship between political influence actions andbenefits obtained from public procurement. We develop atheoretical model of electoral competition where interest groups canengage in both ex-ante campaign contributions and ex-post lobbyingcontributions. We derive the optimal distribution of ex-ante andex-post contributions by interest groups to candidates. If thepreference of the interest groups are aligned, political contributionsto both candidates are increasing in their respective announcedexpenditures. Ex-ante and ex-post contributions are imperfectsubstitutes and the higher the announced expenditure, the more biasedthe distribution is towards (ex-post) lobbying. Using previously unavailable individual-level data, we test empirically the predictions of the model and to model the probability of obtaining a public contract as a function of both ex-ante and ex-post efforts by interest groups.